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reversed, holding that the defendant's general denial was sufficient to
put all the plaintiff's allegations in issue. The Court reasoned that
the particularity requirement was inapplicable because the plaintiff
had already specified the pertinent conditions in his complaint, and
thus the essential purpose of the requirement
i.e., to give the plainwas satisfied.70
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CPLR 3016(c): Specificity of pleading requirement applied to counterclaim in divorce action.
CPLR 5016(c) requires that the complaint in an action for separation contain the nature, circumstances, time, and place of each
act allegedly constituting the defendant's misconduct. In Deane v.
Deane,7 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, applied this pleading requirement to the defendant's counterclaim72 for divorce, reasoning that since the ground pleaded, cruel and inhuman treatment,
is identically worded for separation and divorce,7 3 "[n]o distinction is
made between the nature or the level of proof required to establish
[this ground] insofar as it may relate to [either action]." 74 Thus, the
court concluded, the same standards of pleading should apply.
CPLR 3016(c) was created at a time when multiple grounds existed for separation, while the only ground for divorce was adultery,
and the pleading requirements for the latter were less than for the
former. When the grounds for divorce were expanded in 196775 no
pleading provision corresponding to CPLR 3016(c) was created.7 6 This
legislative inactivity prompted the Supreme Court, Delaware County,
in Houck v. Houck,77 to conclude that a complaint for divorce should
be given a more liberal reading than one for separation on identical
grounds.
Although the Deane court indicated that the consequences of failing to satisfy this section will be minimal - the delinquent party
may have to file an amended pleading or supply a bill of particulars,
70 30 N.Y.2d at 233, 282 N.E.2d at 603, 331 N.YS.2d at 641.
7169 Misc. 2d 1024, 332 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
72 CPLR 3019(t) provides: "A cause of action contained in a counterclaim . . . shall
be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint ...
73 Compare DRL 200(1) with DRL 170(l).
74 69 Misc. 2d at 1025, 332 N.YS.2d at 304.
75 DRL 170.
76 See 3 WK&M
3016.08.
77 59 Misc. 2d 1070, 300 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1968).
78 There is a disagreement as to whether a bill of particulars may be utilized for
this purpose. Several cases have stated that this device must be held inappropriate if
CPLR 3016(c) is to retain its effectiveness. See Pustilnik v. Pustilnik, 24 App. Div. 2d 868,
264 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1965) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JoHN's
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this minor gap, in the symmetry of the CPLR should be rectified by
the Legislature.
ARucLE 31-

DiscLosulm

CPLR 3120: Discovery and inspection available against the state as
nonparty witness.
In Kaplan v. Kaplan,79 the Court of Appeals decided whether
the state is immune from disclosure as a nonparty witness. The state
is subject to discovery by court order under CPLR 3102(f) when it is
a party to an action.8 0 In Butironi v. Putnam County Civil Service
Commission,8 ' the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that
the state was not required to make disclosure as a witness. The court
reasoned that when the Legislature amended CPLR 3102(f) to make
clear that disclosure was available against the state as a party, it had
foregone the opportunity of similarly broadening CPLR 3120(b) to
permit disclosure against the state as a witness 8 2
In Kaplan, the defendants applied under CPLR 3120 for discovery and inspection of documents in the possession of the State
Department of Health. The department resisted the application on
the ground that it was not a party to the action and was not "a person not a party" made equally subject to disclosure under CPLR
3120(b) as a party is under CPLR 3120(a).8 3 The Supreme Court,
New York County, ordered disclosure, and the Appellate Division,
First Department, unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, construing the word "person" in CPLR 3120(b) to
include the state.8 4 The Court rejected the Butironi rationale, reasoning that the Legislature did not amend CPLR 3120(b) because it
was decided under the CPA that the state could be examined as a
witness.8,
L. RE. 121, 141 (1966); Kurcz v. Kurcz, 13 App. Div. 2d 954, 216 N.Y.2d 736 (Ist Dep't
1961) (mem.); Glick v. Glick, 63 Misc. 2d 944, 311 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1970). The more liberal view of the Deane case, which allows its use, is endorsed by
Professor Siegel. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3016, supp. commentary at 172 (1972).
79 31 N.Y.2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 691, 334 N.Y.S.2d 879, af'g 38 App. Div. 2d 691, 327
N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep't 1971).
80 However, the state cannot be required to answer interrogatories or to make

admissions.
8129 App. Div. 2d 474, 288 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 502, 325 (1968).
82 Id. at 476, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
83 CPLR. 3120(a) provides for the discovery and production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, testing, or photographing.

84 31 N.Y.2d at 69, 286 N.E.2d at 262, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
85 Id., citing City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 305 N.Y. 369, 113 N.E2d 520

